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ABSTRACT
For decades economists and political scientists have sought to identify
variables that influence the electoral success of public officials. Most of
the existing literature Jbcuses on the determinants of ftderal elections.
This study examines elections to the Virginia House of Delegates and finds
that campaign expenditures, incumbency status, party affiliation, and
district voting tendencies all are significant predictors of electoral success.
Additionally, this study finds that the returns to campaign expenditures, in
terms oqfthe additional votes that they generate, vary based on incumbency,
party affiliation, number of opponents in the race, and over time.
INTRODUCTION
I I very year Virginia households are inundated with campaign literature,
Etelevision ads and radio spots. With state legislative elections taking
place in odd-years and federal elections occurring in the years in between,
Virginians are given the opportunity to vote every November. With this
'perpetual' election cycle, newspaper headlines and talk shows saturate
their audiences with analyst predictions and most significantly, the up-to-
date quarterly FEC and state financial disclosure reports. The emphasis of
these broadcasts is placed specifically on those candidates earning record-
breaking sums or their counterparts revealing appalling contribution
numbers. These financial figures gain enormous attention, underscoring the
importance that the media and the public places on candidate fundraising.
This paper will estimate the influence that campaign expenditures have
on Virginia House of Delegates election outcomes, examining the 2001,
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2003, and 2005 state legislature races.
With its unique off-year state legislative election cycle, Virginia
voters are constantly subjected to media reports on campaign financing.
For example, prior to the most recent 2007 election, the Richhmond Times
Dispatch published numerous stories concerning the state legislative races
and the enormous sums being raise by candidates. A featured article in
the September 19"h issues titled, "Money for Senate Race Flowing into
Candidates," highlights the record-breaking fundraising of a northern
Virginia Senate contest, citing it to be the most expensive state legislative
race ever. Similarly, the article "GOP Holds Overall Fundraising Edge,"
written immediately after the June financial figures were released,
discusses the strong financial showing among Republican candidates at
that time. These articles, like many others, emphasize the recurrent trend
of enormous campaign contributions being raised in Virginia Senate and
House of Delegates races. The total amount of campaign funds raised
in Virginia for the 2007 state legislative races (House and Senate) was
approximately $33 million ($16.7M Democrats; $15.2M Republicans-
S.IM 3rd Party). Only four other states spent more money on state
legislative races over the 2006 to 2007 election cycles (California, $91.7M;
Texas, $65.5M; Pennsylvania, $50.7M; and Illinois, $38.9M), according
to the National Institute on Money in State Politics. The average total
state-wide expenditure on state legislative races over these two years
was approximately $13.6 million. The fact that individual candidates
continually bring in such tremendous sums indicates that they, like the
media, perceive campaign funds as essential for electoral success.
The conventional wisdom among both pundits and politicians is
that the more candidates spend, the more they benefit. Along with this
observation is the belief that campaign expenditures for both incumbents
and challengers exhibit diminishing marginal returns, and that the returns
to campaign expenditures vary by party and incumbency status. These
beliefs are largely supported in studies of national office holders, and
are likely at the root of these perceptions; however, there has been little
empirical analysis of state legislative elections. This paper will examine
the effect of campaign expenditures on vote percentage in elections for the
Virginia House of Delegates., controlling for a number of other observable
characteristics that may influence voting outcomes. Specifically, this paper
will test the hypotheses that: (1) campaign expenditures have a positive
impact on vote shares; (2) that there are diminishing returns to campaign
expenditures; (3) that the returns to campaign expenditures are greatest
for third party, non-incumbent candidates, who benefit the most from
increases in advertising and exposure that usually accompanies campaign
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expenditures. The variables controlled for in this paper include incumbency,
terms served, the opposition's district level party strength, party status and
opponent's expenditures. Furthermore, this paper tests for variation in the
effects of campaign expenditures on vote shares by incumbency status
and party affiliation. Additionally, the following analyses will test for
differences in the effect of these variables in two candidate versus three
or more candidate races, and in changes in these effects across election
years.
The following section of the paper briefly discusses the most
relevant studies from the literature on campaign financing, followed in
section III by a description of the data; section IV presents the empirical
results, and section V concludes the paper with a discussion of the
implications of this analysis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent studies investigating the importance of fundraising have
been discussed in a variety of papers and scholarly articles. A number
of these studies focus on how the sources and uses of these funds are
operationalized to influence election outcomes. In related studies, Coates
(2004), and Houser and Stratmann (2008) conclude that voters are swayed
by the sources of a candidate's funds, such that voters are less likely to elect
a candidate that they perceive as being funded by special interest groups.
On the uses side of the equation, Abrajano and Morton (2004) examine
when candidates choose to advertise differences in substance (i.e. policy
differences) with their opponents versus differences in leadership style.
They find that the closer the candidate's positions are to the median voter
the more likely the candidate will emphasize substance, while candidates'
whose position are further from the center will emphasize style.
A number of studies have complemented those above by
estimating the returns to campaign financing. In particular, there is
substantial agreement that campaign expenditures exhibit diminishing
marginal returns (Houser and Stratmann (2008), Stratmann (2004), and
Gierzynski and Breaux (1993)). Additionally, there is evidence to support
the claim that while incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage, increases
in incumbent campaign expenditures yield lower increases in the vote
percentage won. The lower (or in some cases zero) incumbent returns to
campaign expenditures is supported by studies by Moon (2006), Levitt
(1994), Thomas (1989), Ragsdale and Cook (1987), and Feldman and
Jondrow (1984).
The importance of campaign expenditures on election outcomes
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has been substantiated across a spectrum of local, state, and national
elections. Nagle and Leighley (1992) investigate the role of campaign
expenditures in presidential elections. They find that spending in
presidential elections was higher in states where the race was expected to
be closer and where the outcome was pivotal to the overall election. They
conclude that campaign expenditures have a positive and significant effect
on the percentage of the vote received in these states.
The majority of empirical campaign expenditure studies seem
to focus on US House of Representative or national races (Epstein and
Franck (2007), Moon (2006), Medvic (2001), Palda and Palda (1998), and
Levitt (1994)). This is likely due to the availability of data, the number of
observations (large number of races, office holders, and candidates), and
variation in the variables of interest. Some of these studies conclude that
campaign expenditures have little to no effect on election outcomes (Levitt
(1994), Palda and Palda (1998)). This general conclusion is qualified,
however, by noting that challengers often receive an increase in voting
shares from campaign expenditures, while incumbents do not (Milyo
(2001)). On the other hand, most studies of US Senate races conclude
that there is a positive and significant return to incumbents' campaign
expenditures (Abramowitz (1988), Grier (1989), and Moon (2006)). In
short, there is little overall consensus regarding the influence of campaign
expenditures on congressional elections.
Other studies have focused on the effect of campaign financing
on state level elections. These studies concluded that spending does
affect gubernatorial election outcomes (Calcagno and Westley (2005),
Partin (2002)), and that finance rules have differential effects across party
lines in influencing election outcomes (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose
(2002)). Daniel and Lott (1997) and Besley and Case (2002) investigate
determinants of state legislature elections, with Daniel and Lott (1997)
finding that campaign fundraising in California state legislative races
has declined as a result of term limits initiated in 1990, and that more
incumbents are being unseated.
To our knowledge there has been little empirical investigation into
the relationships between vote shares and campaign expenditures for state
legislative races. This study will fill this void by examining the effects of
campaign expenditures on contested Virginia House of Delegates races,
with a special emphasis on examining the modifying effects of incumbency
and party affiliation on the returns to campaign expenditures.
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DATA
The data in this analysis comes from the 2001, 2003 and 2005
contested House of Delegates elections gathered from the Virginia State
Board of Elections and the Virginia Public Access Project (VPAP). Both
provide up-to-date records of election results as well as the appropriate
financial disclosure data. By law, each candidate is required to publish
their campaign expenditures each election cycle. Included in VPAP's
financial reports are incumbency status and candidate tenure (number
of terms served). Table 1 illustrates the party breakdown for the 2001,
2003 and 2005 election cycles. Five party labels are included; however,
the Green, Independent and Libertarian party labels are aggregated
and considered 'third-party' for the purpose of this paper. Although the
number of candidates and contested elections changes drastically from
cycle to cycle, the average campaign expenditures for both Democrats and
Republicans have steadily increased. The average Democratic campaign
expenditure has increased from $80,583 in 2001 to $188,218 in 2005, a
134 percent rise. This compares to an 88 percent increase in Republican
expenditures from $100,084 in 2001 to $187,747 in 2005. Overall, 314
total candidates are examined in 145 contested elections.
A candidate's own campaign expenditures are rather self-
explanatory. Summary measures presented in Table 2 reveal that
expenditures ranged from zero to $580,788, with an average campaign
expenditure of $116,159. Opponents' campaign expenditures are the total
amount of expenditures by all of a candidate's opponents, which is why
the maximum and average opponent expenditure is greater than one's own
expenditures. The maximum amount spent by opponents is $783,683 and
the average is $144,306.
If a candidate is runming only against a Democratic opponent, then
thai candidate's opponent's district lean index is calculated by averaging
the percentage of voters from that district who voted for the Democratic
gubernatorial candidate in the 1997, 2001, and 2005 gubernatorial races.
If a candidate is running only against a Republican, then the opponent's
district lean is just the average of the percentage of voters from that
district who voted for the Republican gubernatorial candidate in those
same election years. If a (third party) candidate is running against both a
Republican and a Democrat then that candidate's opponents' district lean is
the sum of the average Republican and Democratic vote shares in the three
gubernatorial elections. The district lean index is meant to measure the
prevailing voter opposition within their district to a candidate's political
affiliation. One potential problem in seeking to create an individualized
39
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district lean index is the redistricting that occurred in Virginia in 2001.
The National Committee for an Effective Congress, however, effectively
corrects for this by calibrating election results by precinct. The minimum
opponent's district lean is 22.1; the maximum is 100 (a third-party
candidate running against a Democrat and a Republican in a district where
the third party gubernatorial candidate received virtually no votes), with a
mean of 53.372.
Contested election results prior to 2001 were not considered in
this analysis for two reasons. The first potential difficulty stemmed from
redistricting that occurred in 2001. Along with significant shifts in the
geographical make-up of the districts, several had demographic shifts
that would severally bias the results. Secondly, 2001 is the first year party
identification was placed on the ballot with the candidate's name. This
allows for party status to be considered in the model.
The following section of the paper discusses the estimates of these
variables on election results to the Virginia House of Delegates.
Table 1: Summary Measures
vtim ber o/ C a nd id utes I Q -a
"total mi
Eeto Inet Cad -ested
Ymoat Green -ndent Libertarian Republican -dates Elections
2001 i4 I 14 6 55 13)0 50
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2005 44 I 14 4 43 11)6 49
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Table 2: Summary Measures
Mean Minimum Maximum
Vote Percentage 46.161 .5 84.0
Expenditures $116,159 $0.00 $580,788
Opponents' Expenditures $144,306 $0.00 $783,683
Nu.mber of Candidates 2.29 2 5
Terms Served 1.53 0 21
Opponents' District Lean 53.372 22.2 100.0
Dummy Variables
Republican .42 0 1
Democrat .42 0 1
Third Party .16 0 1
Incumbent .34 0 1
REGRESSION RESULTS
We regress the percentage of votes received by each candidate
for the Virginia House of Delegates against the number of tern-s served,
dummy variables for incumbency and party affiliation, campaign
expenditures and its quadratic, the opponents' campaign expenditures, and
the opponents' district lean (see Table 3, specification (1)). We include
a quadratic in campaign expenditures to test our hypothesis that there are
diminishing marginal returns to expenditures. Additionally, we include
both the incumbency dummy variable and the number of terns served to
test if there is both a discrete jump in the vote percentage for incumbents
and an incremental benefit from serving additional terms in office. Before
turning to the campaign expenditure effect it is interesting to note that
incumbents receive an 8.9 percentage point advantage over challengers,
and that each additional term served increases this advantage by almost
.7 percentage points. Similarly, Republican and Democratic affiliated
candidates benefit from a 9.052 and 6.539 percentage point advantage
over third party candidates, respectively. Furthermore, it is not surprising
to find that the greater the district lean against a candidate the smaller the
expected votes received. For example, a Democrat running in a heavily
leaning Republican district receives significantly fewer votes than would
a Republican running in the same district. All of the above results are
statistically significant at the 99 percent level of significance.
Turning to the variable of primary interest to this analysis,
campaign expenditures exhibit a statistically significant positive impact
on the percentage of votes received. For the purpose of this paper,
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expenditures are defined as all campaign activities paid and accounted
for specifically from the candidate's campaign committee. We find that
an increase in campaign expenditures has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the percentage of votes received. Additionally, we
find diminishing marginal returns to additional campaign expenditures
such that as expenditures increase the additional gains in percentage of
votes received decline. Evaluated at campaign expenditures of $150,000,
each additional $10,000 of expenditures increases the percentage of votes
received by approximately one third of a percentage point, at the margin.
This result confirms Gierzynski and Breaux's (1993) conclusion that
campaign expenditures exhibit a positive influence on vote percentage.
Furthennore, opponent expenditures were also found to provide a small,
but statistically significant impact with $10,000 of opponent spending
leading to a percentage vote decrease of . 164 percent for the candidate.
In order to further investigate the type of campaign expenditures
that influence vote percentage, we interacted expenditures with party
and incumbency status (see Table 3, specification (2)). By utilizing an
incumbent-challenger binomial and creating an interaction with candidate
expenditures, we are able to test for possible differences in the impact of
campaign expenditures by incumbency status. For every $10,000 spent by
incumbent delegates, they receive an increase in the percentage of votes
received by approximately .738 (ignoring the relatively minor quadratic
effect for simplicity of presentation, the incumbency effect equals 1.211 -
.473). This effect differs substantially from the gains that are achieved
by challenger expenditures. Third party challengers are afforded a 1.211
percentage point increase for every $10,000 spent. This represents a
return on campaign expenditures of almost 65 percent more per $10,000
than incumbents receive.
In evaluating the significance of incumbency, we define the
incumbent advantage as the additional electoral support gained by a
candidate due to his or her incumbency status (Cox and Morgenstern
(1995)). These activities include franking privileges, increased visibility
through voter contact, legislative accomplishments to campaign on and a
fundraising base already in place.
With a breadth of institutional knowledge, campaign experience
and name recognition, incumbency affords candidates an initial 16.971
percentage point cushion. To examine this effect more closely, Graph I
illustrates expenditures versus vote percentage between incumbents and
challengers. By breaking down expenditures into $50,000 increments,
the incumbency effect is quite visible. Although the initial incumbency
advantage is hard to observe because the lack of incumbent spending less
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than $50,000, a major explanation fbr the preliminary gap between the
incumbent and challenger curve can be attributed directly to incumbency
status and not campaign expenditures.
Table 3: Regression Results:
Dependent Variable is the Percentage of Votes Won
Conistant
Terms Served
Incumbent
IExpenditures
IExp'enditLres-
squared
Opponent's
IExpenditule
Republican
Deniocrat
Opponents"
D)isirict Lean
Incumbent
Fxpenditure
Republican
Expendiiure
Der.iocrat
F'xpenditLre
Nurnber of
Observations
R-Squared
Specification I
62.539***
(3.370)
.681"***
(.200)
8.934***
(1.433)
.631"**
(.119)
-.009"***
(.003)
.164***
(.043)
9.052***
(1.744)
6.539***
(1.742)
-.555***
SpecificationA2)
59.871 ***
(3.246)
.113 .569***
(.183)
.224 16.971"***
(1.934)
.377 1.211"
(.189)
.239
-. 121
.236
.171
-.463
(.043)
-.003
(.003)
-182"***
(.041)
13.757"**
(1.902)
8.047***
(1.862)
-.504"**
(.041)
.473***
(.094)
.800"***
(.197)
-.589** *
(.191)
314
.852
314
.817
Note- *** indicales significant at the I percent I\ cL *.* at the 5 peicent lc\%cl,* at the I o percent
ic\ cl. Slandardi/ed coefficient., ae presented in the ritgh hand column ofeach e p.cipication.
.095
.426
.724
-.080
-. 134
.359
-.420
-.246
-.415
-.307
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According to (h-aph 1, the Hirst SIT000O) a challenger spends
provides the greatest marginal gains in percentage \otes. These initial
expenditures offer challengers the ability to gain name recognition,
credibility among the public and the media and the resources to persuade
voters. Challenger expenditures also illustrate diminishing marginal returns
coinciding with the findings of Gierzynski and Breaux (1993). Confirmed
by the -. 003 expenditures squared coefficient, challenger expenditures
begin to gain marginally less per dollar after SI100,000 is spent.
Graph I: Incumbent Expenditures and Mean Vote Percentage
N00
incumbent
700-
0 o-
300O
20 o- callenger
MOo-
100-
aC 100 200 000 400 50C 600 7 0 8C 0 10go
expendgroup
Although incumbents enjoy an initial 16.97 1 percentage vote
lead, at only txwo levels is the marginal percentage of vote won for
incumbent expenditures greater than the challengers. This occurs for
incumbent expenditures between S200,000 and S250,000 and over
S350M000. Overall, the graph is consistent with the findings of (lantz,
Abramowitz and Burkart (1976), who suggest an inverse relationship
between challenger expenditures and incumbent margin of victory. Graph
I demonstrates that as challenger expenditures increase, the percentage
by which an incumbent wx ins decreases, however, I find a small widening
of the margins when both candidates have spent between S200,000 and
S2501000 and above S350,000.
The incumbency advantage allo%s canxidates an initial electoral
cushion, however, longevity in office also allows for a statistically
significant influence. As specification (2) in Table 2 demonstrates,
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incumbents gain a .569 percent increase in total vote percentage per
terms served. Length in office provides incumbents with numerous
legislative and electoral tools needed to succeed on the campaign trail.
Seniority status in committees allows for more district-specific projects
and influence in passing individual legislation. With this legislative clout
comcs fundraising advantages including money from special-interest
groups and political action committees. Electorally, delegates serving in
office longer are able to sustain high levels of name identification and will
have unique insights into campaigning in their respective districts.
Along with incumbency status and tenure, several exogenous
factors influence the electorate, including the partisan lean of the district
toward a candidate's opponents. The opponents' district lean variable
attempts to measure the party voting tendency of a district. For a Democrat,
the opponents' district lean is the average percentage of the district's voters
who voted for the Republican gubernatorial candidate in the 1997, 2001,
and 2005 elections, for a Republican it is the average percentage who
voted for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in these elections; for
a third-party candidate running just against a Democrat it is tile average
percentage who voted for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in these
elections; f`r a third-party candidate runningjust against a Republican it is
tile average percentage who voted Republican in these elections- and, for
a third party candidate running against both a Republican and a Democrat
it is the sum of the average percentage who voted Democrat or Republican
in these races. A one percentage point increase in the opponents' district
lean reduces a candidate's vote share by approximately half a percentage
point, ceteris paribus.
An alternative measure of district lean utilized presidential,
senatorial, and gubernatorial election results, while another used just
gubernatorial and the most recent senatorial election. Both alternative
measures of district lean produced qualitatively similar results to the
measure outlined above. This was not surprising as the correlation
coefficients across these three measures of district lean were never lower
than .988, suggesting that district level partisan voting patterns are quite
consistent across elections and offices. (These tests of robustness are
not shown, but are available from the author upon request.)
Not only is the partisan lean of a district significant, but also the
party label of each candidate him or herself. With 50 third-party candidates
running for the Virginia House of Delegates during 2001, 2003 and 2005,
they significantly impact the traditional two-party electoral process. When
analyzing the impact of the Democrat and Republican Party labels on third-
party candidates, Republicans are afforded an initial 13.757 percentage
C(AMPAI(iN I XPENDITURFS
lead while Democrats benefit from an 8.047 vote percentage increase.
When considering party label expenditures on third-party candidates,
Republican expenditures provide a .411 percent increase per S10,000
(1.211-.800). Similarly, Democratic candidate expendltures garner .622
percent of the vole per $10,000 (1 .211 -.589). These findings demonstrate
imnportant strengths among the two parties against third-party candidates.
File Republican Party label itself provides a larger initial percentage vote
advantage compared to the Democratic Party label, while Democratic
candidate expenditures provide a greater percentage of vote gains versus
Republican expenditures, and third-party candidates benefit the most from
additional campaign expenditures.
To further examine party expenditure effects, Graph 2 displays
the live party's expenditures against mean vote percentage. The Green
party can not be identified due to its small sample si.e and low levels
of expenditures. Although the Libertarian expenditures are illustrated,
the line disappears at $50,000 because of the lack of significant spending
on behalf of Libertarian candidates. The peculiarities of Independent
candidate expenditures can be attributed to tile small number of candidates
and the bias of a few incumbent independent delegates who have raised
tremendous sums of money compared to other Independent candidates.
The two maJor party candidate expenditures demonstrate similar trends in
their effectiveness of dollars spent per vote percentage. For Democrats and
Republicans the marginal gains are greatest in the first S 100,000 spent with
diminishing returns to marginal expenditures at higher levels of spending.
Graph 2: Party Expenditures and Mean Vote Percentage
,,p,ndg,,,p
Table 4 presents separate regression analyses by the presence
of a third party candidate in the election, advantage, but the returns to
terms served become insignificant. All other results appear qualitatively
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similar to those found in Table 3.
Table 4: Regression Results by presence of a third party candidate
Dependent Variable is the Percentage of Votes Won
No 3!-,artyP 3d Pa[ty
Candidate Candidate
Constant 86.3222*** 45.696***
(3.095) (4.603)
Terms Served -. 142 .027 .667** .108
(.218) (.304)
Incumbent 9.808*** .353 25.954*** .479
(1.924) (3.967)
Expenditures .517*** .439 1.267"* .534
(.117) (.277)
Expenditures-
squared -.002 .098 -.005 -.073
(.003) (.008)
Opponent's
Expenditure -.374*** .317 -.112* -.079
(.043) (.059)
Republican - 16.527*** .299
(3.351)
Democrat -4.638*** .173 7.361** .133
(1.338) (3.416)
Opponents'
District Lean -.756*** .586 -.382*** -.382
(.047) (.062)
Incumbent
Expenditure -. 278*** .223 -.578*** -. 176
(.092) (.199)
Republican
Expenditure -.943*** -.302
(.267)
Democrat
Expenditure .145* .113 -.514*** -. 176
Number of (.082) (.273)
Observations 203 111
R-Squared .832 .899
Note: - ind ictates sigmnficant at the I percent level, * at the 5 percent level. * at the 10 percent ceei, Standardized coefficiein s arc
resented in til righh hand column ol each specification
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Republicans have an edge over Democrats of approximately 4.6 percentage
points, while Democrats enjoy greater returns to campaign expenditures.
Similarly, incumbents receive lower returns to additional expenditures
than challengers. Overall, the returns to campaign expenditures are lower
when focusing on just two party candidate races. This is not surprising
given our earlier finding that third party candidates have higher returns
than major party candidates.
Column (2) of Table 4 presents the results for elections with three
or more candidates running. Here incumbents enjoy an enormous 25.95
percentage point advantage, and a significant .667 returns to terms served.
While incumbents enjoy an initial advantage over challengers in these
three party races, the returns to third party challenger expenditures are
significantly higher than for incumbents and major party candidates. In
these highly contested races with three or more candidates, it appears that
campaign expenditures play an even more important role in determining
election results than in two candidate contests. For third party challengers
each additional $10,000 in campaign expenditures increases their vote
share by approximately 1.3 percentage points. This is in contrast with
a .7 increase for third party incumbents, and .3 increase for Republican
challengers, and a .75 increase for Democratic challengers. In fact, the
returns to campaign expenditures in three party races are estimated to be a
negative .254 for Republican incumbents ( 1.267-.943-.5 78). It appears that
third party candidates have the most to gain from campaign expenditures,
and that Republican incumbents gain the least.
As an additional test of our conclusions, we ran separate
regressions for each of the three (2001, 2003, and 2005) election years
(Table 5). This allows the coefficients on each of the regressors to vary
over time. Across all three elections we find that incumbents enjoy a
statistically significant increase in the vote share relative to challengers.
Additionally, while there are positive returns to the number of terms
served across all elections, only in 2003 is it statistically significant.
Opponents' district lean is also significant in all three elections, and the
magnitude of the effect is increasing over time. This suggests that it is
becoming harder for an opposition candidate to run in a partisan district.
On the other hand, both the Republican and Democratic advantage over
third party candidates declined from 2001 to 2005. In 2001, Republicans
and Democrats benefited from a 19.7 and 16.3 advantage over third party
candidates, respectively. By 2005, these advantages were reduced to
only 4.9 and 5.7 percentage points. It is interesting to note that in 2001
Republicans had a 3.4 percentage point edge over their Democratic rivals,
but that in 2005 it was the Democrats who had a .8 percentage point edge
48
VSSJ 2009
over the Republicans. The political landscape had clearly shifted over the
four years, with Republicans losing 7 seats in the House of Delegates.
Table 5: Regression Results by year of election:
Dependent Variable is the Percentage of Votes Won
2001
Constant 41.986***
(4.706)
Terms Served .432
(.332)
Incumbent 23.870***
Expenditures (3.629)
($10,000) 3.158***
(.443)
txpenmiures-
-squared
($10,000)
Opponent's
Expenditure
-,027*
(.015)
($10,000) -.360***
(.102)
Republican 19.687***
(3.073)
Democrat 16.323***
Opponents' (2.867)
District Lean -.377***
. . .
(.059)
Expenditure
($10,000)
Republican
Expenditure
($10,000)
Democrat
Expenditure
($10,000)
Number of
Observations
R-Squared
-I 1.280***
(.267)
-1.720***
(.472)
-2.001***
(.445)
130
.832
2003
56.610**
(6.499)
.063 .942***
(.331)
.575 9.680*
(4.985)
1.073 1.873**
(.738)
-.205 -. 011
(.010)
-. 149 -. 321"***
(.099)
.504 11.850***
(4.443)
.417 4.709
(3.794)
-.314 -.450***
(.080)
-.419 -. 271
(.256)
-. 580 -1.116
(.786)
-. 586 -.921
(.767)
78
.865
Note *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent
level. Standardized coefficients are presented in the right hand column of each specification.
2005
68.603***
(5.189)
.215 .282
(.300)
.278 17.382***
(2.747)
1,077 .681**
(.198)
-.203 -. 004
(.003)
-.200 -. 112***
(.048)
.349 4.895*
(2.726)
.139 5.671*
(2.893)
-.383 -. 636***
(.068)
-. 145 -. 332***
(.110)
-. 589 -. 292
(.197)
-.597 -. 171
(.197)
106
.915
49
.042
.420
.511
-. 133
-. 105
.121
.141
-. 524
-.218
-. 191
-. 115
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Throughout all of these changes, however, campaign expenditures
remained significant in determining election outcomes. The magnitude of
these effects, however, declined over the three election cycles. In 2001,
each additional $10,000 in campaign expenditures increased a candidate's
vote share by over 3 percentage points. This effect was significantly
smaller for incumbents (1.878 percentage points), Republicans (1.438
percentage points), and Democrats (1.157 percentage points). By 2005,
all of these effects had dropped dramatically. For challengers, each
additional $ 10,000 in campaign financing increased the vote share by only
.681 percentage points. For incumbents, it was only .349; for Republicans
it was .389; and for Democrats it was a .51 percentage point increase in
vote share for each additional $10,000 in campaign expenditures.
These separate regressions by election year illustrate that
incumbency, party affiliation, district lean, opponent campaign
expenditures, and one's own campaign expenditures are all significant in
all of the years in determining election results, but that the magnitudes
and relative importance of each of these effects varies across election
cycles. Additionally, the influence of campaign expenditures varies not
just over time, but also based on incumbency status and party affiliation.
Third-party challengers consistently reap the highest returns to campaign
expenditures, while incumbent Republicans have the lowest (or in some
cases negative) returns to campaign expenditures.
CONCLUSION
The results summarized above indicate that campaign expenditures
do have a statistically significant influence on the vote percentage received
in the Virginia House of Delegates. With an R2 of over .8 in all regressions.
expenditures, incumbency, tenure, party label and district lean prove to
be statistically significant and effective predictors of election results. The
initial incumbency advantage presents a huge strategic disadvantage for
challengers, however, challengers, and in particular third-party challengers,
benefit from greater returns to campaign expenditures than incumbents.
We set out to test the hypotheses that: (1) campaign expenditures
have a positive impact on vote shares; (2) that there are diminishing returns
to campaign expenditures; (3) that the returns to campaign expenditures
are greatest for third party, non-incumbent candidates, who benefit the
most from increases in advertising and exposure that usually accompanies
campaign expenditures. We can confidently conclude that in fact campaign
expenditures for most candidates do in fact have a positive and statistically
significant impact on election results. We find what might be characterized
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as weak support for diminishing returns to campaign expenditures. While
the most parsimonious specification finds statistically significant quadratic
effects of campaign expenditures on vote shares, these effects usually
become insignificant with the introduction of interactions of incumbency
and party affiliation with expenditures. This leads to our third hypothesis
that the returns to expenditures are greatest for third-party challengers.
This is clearly the case in Virginia House of Delegates elections. While it
appears in some cases that Republican (the majority party in the Virginia
House of Delegates) incumbents do not obtain significant returns to
campaign expenditures, there are always positive and significant returns
to campaign expenditures for third-party challengers and Democrats.
Although numerous variables were controlled for in the above
regressions, there are a number of possible underlying factors that may
have influenced the election outcomes that were not directly accounted
for. Ignored in the results is the coat-tails effect from other elected officials
running for higher office. Many times, election cycles containing state-
wide or federal candidacies provide a large increase in voter turnout. This
phenomenon can work in favor or against a candidate. Non-regular voters
may come out to vote in favor of a higher office candidate and vote for
other candidates of the same party that they would not have normally
come out to vote for. Conversely, this could also bring out voters of the
opposite party who will end up voting against a candidate even though
they normally would not vote. This phenomenon may explain some of the
changing results found across the three election cycles.
The implications of this paper and the scholarly articles before it
have the potential to change the way modern-day campaigns are managed.
In understanding the different facets that contribute to electoral success,
campaigns may choose to shift their priorities away from fundraising after
they have reached a certain threshold. Campaigns may also be afforded
the ability to remain dynamic, recognizing when to shift away from the
original campaign strategy depending on the finances of their opponent.
From a donor standpoint, knowing the significance of several
variables within a specific district could provide for more effective
allocation of campaign contributions. Donors could target races in which
the marginal vote percentage payoff would be higher, such as third party
challengers against incumbent Republicans. Conversely, individuals
and state parties could avoid dumping hundreds of thousands of dollars
into races that will prove to be losses. These findings may also dissuade
candidates from investing their own money into races if the marginal
returns prove to be inconsequential. Finally, the importance of campaign
finance laws come into question with campaign expenditures potentially
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exhibiting diminishing marginal returns, with incumbents achieving
significantly lower or even negative returns to expenditures. If candidates
want to spend millions of dollars where they may potentially be no longer
earning a significant percentage of the vote, the true value of publicly
financing campaigns may be in doubt.
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